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It would be idle to pretend that publication alone . . . is a
reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact
1
that their rights are before the court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Service of process is a critical aspect of litigation.

2

In an

† Jessica Klander grew up in Saint Cloud, Minnesota. She earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in English Literature in 2004 from Macalester College in
St. Paul, Minnesota. Before attending law school she worked as a sales account
executive, an office manager, and most recently as a licensed independent
insurance agent in Becker, Minnesota. Jessica is expected to receive her juris
doctor from William Mitchell College of Law in May 2010.
1. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
2. See Rachel Cantor, Internet Service of Process: A Constitutionally Adequate
Alternative?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 945 (1999) (“A fundamental component of
due process is the opportunity to be heard; that opportunity is worthless unless the
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adversarial system, the rules safeguarding service of process ensure
3
that the defendant is able to properly defend and be fairly heard.
Yet, perhaps because it forms the bedrock of procedural due
process, it is among the slowest rules to adapt to modern-day
4
litigation. The standards for substituted service, specifically service
5
by publication, are controlled by case law over a century old.
Despite the amenability, speed, and efficiency of modern-day
technology, service by publication has not been modified to reflect
6
these advances. Recently, in Shamrock Development v. Smith, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed, and perhaps further
7
tightened, the historic restrictions on service by publication.
Critics and commentators have begun to challenge the efficacy of
restrictions on service by publication, asserting that electronic
publication may not only be constitutionally permissible, but a
8
As one commentator
superior means of effecting service.
suggested, “[electronic publication] offers a potentially greater
likelihood to effect notice than traditional methods of
9
publication.”
defendant is aware that there is a matter pending against her.”); Aaron R.
Chacker, E-ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio International Interlink, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 597, 599 (2003) (“American jurisprudence regards notice as a fundamental
procedural component of commencing litigation.”) (citation omitted).
3. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 945 (noting that notice protects defendants’
constitutionally protected right of due process); Chacker, supra note 2, at 602
(noting that due process requires defendants to be given notice of hearing against
them and the opportunity to raise objections).
4. See Adriana L. Shultz, Comment, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process Via
Social Networking Sites, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1497, 1499, 1528 n.10 (2009) (“The
requirement that plaintiffs give notice to defendants of claims against them has
existed in some form for over 4,000 years . . . . One of the earliest known legal
codes, the Code of Eshnunna, required plaintiffs to ‘shout’ or ‘speak’ their cause
of action.”) (citing REVUAN YARON, THE LAWS OF ESHNUNNA 118–19 (Magnes Press
1988)).
5. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878) (substituted service by
publication is insufficient for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction but does
support an exercise of in rem jurisdiction), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (holding that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must comport with the International Shoe minimum contacts test).
6. See Lindy Burris Arwood, Personal Jurisdiction: Are the Federal Rules Keeping
Up With (Internet) Traffic?, 39 VAL. U. REV. 967, 970 (2005) (asserting that doctrinal
emphasis on territorial boundaries and notice is antiquated in the context of
modern technology and electronic communication).
7. 754 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 2008). See infra notes 70–77 and accompanying
text.
8. See infra Part IV, notes and accompanying text.
9. Christopher B. Woods, Commercial Law: Determining Repugnancy in an
Electronic Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic Writing and Signature Legislation,
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This note first examines the history of service of process and
10
It then details the
the evolution of service by publication.
11
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Shamrock, followed by an
12
The note then explores the
analysis of that decision.
13
constitutional sufficiency of electronic service and how it may
actually be constitutionally required, given the wealth of evidence
suggesting that electronic communication is an increasingly
14
Furthermore, case
prevalent medium for social interaction.
precedent and recent amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure show a widespread trend towards further incorporation
15
of electronic processes, indicating that a similar shift is likely for
16
service of process. Finally, the note concludes that because the
Shamrock court’s decision further restricts service by publication
notwithstanding modern technology and constitutional notions of
service of process, the ruling may be unconstitutional and in need
17
of reevaluation.
II. HISTORY
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Unites States Constitution
promises that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
18
property, without due process of law.” The cornerstone of due
process is to guard against governmental abuse of power and to
ensure the opportunity to be heard, which is enforced through
19
Historically, a state’s jurisdictional
jurisdictional limitations.
power to confer a judgment on an individual was based on
20
territorial boundaries and the individual sovereignty of the states.
Thus, in order to establish personal jurisdiction, the defendant was
21
to be personally served within the boundaries of the state. If this
was impossible, there were only limited instances where substituted
52 OKLA. L. REV. 411, 445 (1999).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Part IV.C.
15. See infra Part IV.D.
16. See infra Part IV.D.
17. See infra Parts IV.E, V.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. Id.; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950).
20. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn.
2008) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877)).
21. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723.
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22

service was an appropriate means for providing adequate notice.
Of the alternatives available for providing notice, service by
publication has traditionally been viewed most harshly by the
23
courts, because it is deemed to provide essentially no notice at all.
The Court’s skepticism is evident in the 1878 case that laid the
24
common law foundation for personal jurisdiction, Pennoyer v. Neff.
In Pennoyer, the Court greatly restricted the use of service by
publication by requiring that the defendant be personally served
within the boundaries of the state in order for jurisdiction to
25
exist. An exception allowing service by publication was made for
actions concerning property within the state that had been seized
26
from a nonresident owner. Conversely, the court explained that
where the defendant was a nonresident and the cause of action did
not involve property within the state, service by publication was
27
always invalid.
This ruling was adopted into Minnesota law and reflected in a
28
1917 ruling involving an alimony judgment. In Roberts v. Roberts,
the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the common law standard,
holding that service by publication is void where the defendant is a
29
resident of the state and can be found. But where the defendant
resides in the state and intentionally evades service of process,
30
service by publication is valid. As businesses expanded nationally
and the complexity of multi-party litigation became more
prominent, the physical presence standard set by Pennoyer became

22. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (holding that delivery of
summons to a defendant’s last and usual place of abode is sufficient due process
in some circumstances); see also Shultz, supra note 4, at 1503–05 (delineating the
expansion of the law to include alternative forms of substitute service including:
service by publication, mail, telefax, facsimile, and e-mail).
23. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (“Chance alone brings to the attention of
even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a
newspaper”); Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are you Being Served?: E-mail and (Due) Service of
Process, 51 S.C. L. REV. 227, 242 (2000) (“[S]ervice of process through posting or
publication often provides less certainty that notice will reach the defendant than
other methods of notification.”); Woods, supra note 9, at 444 (“[P]ublication
cannot reasonably be argued to provide notice.”); id. at 444–45 (“Any defendant
outside of that area is virtually assured of not being notified.”).
24. 95 U.S. at 724.
25. Id. at 727.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 398, 161 N.W. 148, 148 (Minn. 1917).
29. Id. at 400, 161 N.W. at 149.
30. Id.
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31

increasingly scrutinized.
International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington answered these concerns by expanding the Pennoyer
physical presence rule to require an analysis of the defendant’s
minimum contacts within the state, rather than domiciliary status
32
Interestingly, although the standards for personal
alone.
jurisdiction were ultimately expanded by the Court, the
requirements for affecting substituted service were left relatively
33
unchanged. Therefore, a defendant might meet the standards for
minimum contacts within a state, but jurisdiction does not exist
34
until the defendant has first been adequately served.
The standard for publication was challenged soon after the
International Shoe decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
35
The Court recognized that although personal service is
Trust.
greatly preferred, when it is impracticable, substituted service may
36
be necessary to ensure finality of the dispute. Although the Court
determined service by publication to be adequate in Mullane, it
cautioned against the overuse of service by publication stating that
“[service by publication] do[es] not sweep away the rule that within
the limits of practicability, notice must be such as is reasonably
37
calculated to reach interested parties.”
“Reasonably calculated” became the formula for the
38
constitutional standard of constructive notice. This formula was
39
reflected in a 1967 Minnesota alimony suit, Gill v. Gill. The court
admitted that although publication is not a reliable means of
notification, it is an appropriate substitute where it is “not
reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate

31. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945); see also Shultz,
supra note 4, at 1499 (suggesting that growth and commercial expansion made the
Pennoyer standard unworkable). See generally Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The
Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337
(2003) (describing the expansion of service of process).
32. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
33. Although the court did not directly determine the sufficiency of substitute
forms of service of process, they did acknowledge the expansion of the law to
include notice via registered mail when reasonably calculated to best notify the
defendant. Id. at 320.
34. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 384 n.3
(Minn. 2008).
35. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S 306 (1950).
36. Id. at 313.
37. Id. at 318.
38. Id. at 314.
39. 277 Minn. 166, 171, 152 N.W.2d 309, 313 (1967).
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40

warning.” The court held that notice by publication is limited to
41
and dictated by extreme necessity.
Minnesota law, as evidenced in the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure, continues to reflect the historical standard of service by
publication by first requiring adequate service of process before
42
personal jurisdiction can be established. The five circumstances
where service by publication can be used are: (1) where the
defendant domicile resident left the state with the intent to defraud
creditors, avoid service, or remain concealed; (2) where the
plaintiff has acquired a lien on property by attachment and the
defendant is a resident and cannot be found, has left the state, or
the defendant is a nonresident; (3) in marriage dissolution cases;
(4) where the cause of action is regarding property within the state;
43
or (5) in cases of foreclosure.
Despite the advent of the International Shoe minimum contacts
standard and the constitutional formula for due process articulated
in Mullane, the requisite standard for service by publication
remains relatively unchanged, holding steadfastly to the historical
44
underpinnings of personal jurisdiction and domiciliary residency.
The stability of this doctrine reflects the intent to limit the
expansion of service by publication and the judicial suspicion that
it threatens the integrity of the due process clause of the
45
Constitution. This is further exemplified by a recent Minnesota
decision, where the courts were again asked to analyze the impact
of modernity on the validity of common law standards of notice
46
and due process. Again in Shamrock Development, Inc. v. Smith, the
courts remained rigidly true to the common law restrictions of

40. Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317).
41. Id. In Gill, the resident defendant intentionally hid himself to evade
service and avoid judgment against him. Id. This fact was undisputed in the case
and justified the application of service by publication in order to bring finality to
the dispute. The decision to implement service by publication was ultimately
contingent upon the plaintiff’s success in meeting the conditions outlined in the
statute. Id. So, although the Mullane formula of notice by reasonable calculation
was adopted, meeting the conditions outlined by the statute remained precursory.
Id.
42. See Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 384 n.3
(Minn. 2008).
43. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(a).
44. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 384 n.3; see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
45. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 384 n.3.
46. Id. at 378.
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47

III. THE SHAMROCK DEVELOPMENT DECISION
Shamrock Development, Inc. (“Shamrock”) became involved
in the dispute after Farm Credit Leasing Services Corporation
(“Farm Credit”) assigned them the right to judgment against
48
Dakota Turkey Farms limited partnership (“partnership”). The
judgment came from a civil case in April 1996 in which Farm Credit
prevailed against the partnership and certain individual partners,
49
including Randall Smith (“Smith”).
In 2006, Shamrock decided to renew the judgment by
commencing a new civil action against the debtors on the eve of
50
On March 19, Shamrock
the judgment’s expiration period.
attempted service of process to the partnership’s registered
Medina, Minnesota address, but discovered it was now owned by a
51
Shamrock
private resident unassociated with the partnership.
then effected service of process on the partnership by serving the
52
Secretary of State.
Subsequently, Shamrock attempted to locate Smith, an
53
individual debtor, using an online database. Despite addresses in
the Farm Credit affidavit that specified Smith’s residence as in
Washington, D.C. and his business in Virginia, Shamrock limited
54
the online search to the Medina address. The results indicated
47. Id. at 385.
48. Id. at 379–80.
49. Id. at 379.
50. Id. at 380. By law, all actions in Minnesota to enforce a judgment must be
started within ten years of the entry of that judgment. MINN. STAT. § 541.04
(2006). Shamrock commenced the action against the past debtors just weeks
before the statute of limitations expiration date. Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 380.
51. Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 380. The original action against the
partnership included an affidavit filed by Farm Credit in which it indicated
Smith’s residential address in Washington, D.C., and his business address in
Arlington, Virginia. Id. at 379. Another similar affidavit identified an address in
Medina, Minnesota, as both the residential and business address of one of the
other partners, as well as the registered address for the partnership on file with the
Secretary of State. Id. at 380. When the action by Shamrock was commenced the
partnership was no longer located at the Medina address but was owned by a
private resident unassociated with the suits. Id. at 379–80.
52. Id. at 380. By Minnesota law, when attempted service against an entity
such as a partnership fails because the agent or partner cannot be located at the
address on file with the secretary of state, the claimant can serve the secretary of
state in lieu of the agent or partner. MINN. STAT. § 5.25 (2008).
53. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 380.
54. Id.
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that Smith was “associated” with the Medina address in “some
55
manner,” but the results were largely unsuccessful. On March 22,
Shamrock’s attorney filed a copy of the summons, complaint, and
56
an affidavit initiating service by publication.
Smith moved to dismiss the claim through a limited
appearance, claiming that service by publication was insufficient
because he was not a domicile resident of Minnesota and the form
of publication was not reasonably calculated to notify him,
57
The district court
therefore violating his due process rights.
denied Smith’s motion to dismiss, holding that Minnesota law does
not require the plaintiff to prove the factual elements necessary to
exercise service by publication, but need only show a reasonable
58
good faith belief that the elements do exist. The court of appeals
59
affirmed this decision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decision,
interpreting the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure as limiting
access to service by publication beyond a good faith belief in the
60
The court held that a
information contained in the affidavit.
good faith belief was not sufficient to warrant service by publication
but that the “existence of one of the enumerated circumstances is a
necessary condition for service of process by publication to confer
61
The holding exemplified the court’s narrow
jurisdiction.”
interpretation of the rule and their intent to limit the application
55. Id. After the online database failed, Shamrock searched bankruptcy
filings and hired a private investigator. Id. These efforts, albeit brief, were also
unsuccessful. Id.
56. Id. The affidavit stated: “Defendant Randall N. Smith is a resident
individual domiciliary who has departed from the State of Minnesota with intent
to defraud creditors, or to avoid service, or remains concealed within with the like
intent.” Id. The summons was then published in Finance and Commerce, a
Minneapolis business and legal newspaper, on March 24, 31, and April 7, 2006. Id.
at 381.
57. Id. at 381.
58. Id. The district court interpreted Minnesota law as requiring only that
the affidavit forming the basis for service by publication be made honestly and in
good faith by the plaintiff based on information available. Id.
59. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock I), 737 N.W.2d 372, 381 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2007).
60. Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383. The court commented that the language
of the service by publication rule was “plain,” indicating that the rule “does not
confer jurisdiction unless one of five specific circumstances actually exists.” Id.
The court ultimately reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district
court to determine if Smith was in fact a Minnesota resident and if he had
intended to defraud investors or avoid service. Id. at 385.
61. Id. at 383.
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of service by publication. Shamrock stands to affirm the two
requirements needed within the plaintiff’s affidavit to exercise
service by publication: “(1) an affirmation of the essential
jurisdictional facts of one of the enumerated cases . . . and (2) an
affirmation of the affiant’s belief that the defendant is not a
62
resident of the state or cannot be found in the state.”
The Shamrock ruling regarding service by publication is
consistent with the historical foundation of the Pennoyer standard
and state sovereignty, allowing the exercise of personal jurisdiction
63
over residents of the state only when they are physically present.
The decision is also consistent with previous holdings by the court
64
regarding standards for service by publication. The consistency of
this ruling with historical standards is fitting because the facts of
this case are largely unremarkable and do not diverge from
65
According to the court,
previous service by publication cases.
Shamrock overlooked the affidavit containing Smith’s contact
information, and because of this oversight, service by publication
66
However, the court did not only apply the
was inadequate.
67
traditional standard, but articulated a more restrictive rule.
Despite the Mullane formula of reasonable calculation, the court’s
decision suggests that the application of the service of process rule
68
should be both hierarchical and conditional. One could infer,
62. Id.
63. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720–24 (1878).
64. See Gill v. Gill, 277 Minn. 166, 152 N.W.2d 309 (1967); Roberts v. Roberts,
135 Minn. 397, 161 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1917); see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
65. The facts are largely unremarkable because, unlike numerous cases
discussed in this note, the plaintiffs are not attempting service through technology
but only through paper publication.
66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the court needed
only to cite the prerequisite for service by publication in order to dismiss the case,
rather than clarify the rule. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, “resorting to
service by publication” requires the plaintiff to have first exercised due diligence
in acquiring the information necessary to find the defendant. 72 C.J.S. Process § 85
(2005). Because the Minnesota Supreme Court believed the plaintiff had failed to
exercise due diligence, the case could have been dismissed. Yet, the court instead
took the opportunity to clarify the elements necessary to assert service by
publication, and thereby further restricted the rule.
67. See discussion supra note 62 and accompanying text.
68. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S 306, 314 (1950);
Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 383–84 n.3 (Minn.
2008). But cf. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014–15 (9th
Cir. 2002) (construing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) and finding subparts of the procedural
service rule were not intended to be treated hierarchically).
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regardless of what type of service might actually be most reasonably
calculated to reach the defendant, that the plaintiff must first
attempt personal service, then, alternatively, leave a copy at the
defendant’s usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and
discretion, and only when those fail may service by substitute means
be adequate. However, service by publication may only be
exercised if the plaintiff believes and can actually prove that one of
69
the five circumstances outlined by the rule exists.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Shamrock Decision
In Shamrock, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff’s good faith belief and due diligence were not sufficient to
70
warrant service by publication. The court clarified the language
of the rule and in so doing, effectively restricted the use of service
by publication by not only reiterating the Pennoyer standard but by
71
also requiring the plaintiff to prove one of the conditions named.
Shamrock became an opportunity for the court to reevaluate the
elements of an archaic rule and perhaps broaden them to reflect
72
Yet instead of broadening the
modern communication.
application of service by publication, the court articulated a stricter
73
interpretation of the rule. Despite the court’s insistence that the
ruling does not reform but only clarifies the existing standard for
74
many
personal jurisdiction and service by publication,
75
commentators would disagree with this assessment. Where the
69. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
70. Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 62.
73. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383; see also supra Part III.
74. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383 (“This interpretation is consistent with
the historical underpinnings of the rule.”).
75. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 4, at 1511 (“[T]he Constitution does not
require any particular means of service of process, but only that the method
selected be reasonably calculated to afford notice and an opportunity to
respond.”) (referring to the decision in Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284
F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002)); Tamayo, supra note 23, at 257 (“As methods of
communication improve and individual mobility increases, mechanisms for
serving process should evolve to allow for more convenient methods of serving
process on a defendant while complying with constitutional due process and
statutory requirements.”); Woods, supra note 9, at 444 (“Electronic publication, on
the other hand, could actually offer a greater likelihood of providing notice than
the traditional method of service by publication.”).
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Mullane formula offers a flexible, ad-hoc approach to deciding the
method most adequate for conferring notice, Shamrock effectively
bars service by publication as a valid means for providing notice by
76
articulating a bright-line, hierarchical standard. This is especially
problematic where modern technology has influenced
communication patterns so as to warrant electronic service as a
77
compelling means for providing notice.
B. Shamrock Decision – Unconstitutional?
While the rules of civil procedure change over time, they are
always bound by the principles encapsulated in constitutional
78
The constitutional threshold for due
notions of due process.
process is that notice must be made by a method that is most
79
“reasonably calculated” to reach the defendant. Personal service
is the classic method for conferring notice and is the preferred
80
method by both procedural and constitutional standards.
However, where personal service is impractical, substitute service is
81
The constitutional
allowed to bring finality to the action.
standard is deliberately broad so as to weigh the defendant’s right
to due process against the State’s interest in bringing finality to the
82
action. The broad constitutional interpretation also encourages
state courts to shape the rules to the facts of the case, expanding
83
upon the rules and often testing constitutional boundaries.
76. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14, 318
(1950); see also supra note 60.
77. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also supra notes 18, 19 and
accompanying text.
79. Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
80. See id. at 313 (“Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is
the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.”).
81. Id. (“[T]he vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its
fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served only if interests or claims of
individuals who are outside of the State can somehow be determined.”); see also 72
C.J.S. Process § 70 (2009) (“Since ‘substituted service’ by its very designation
indicates a form of service which may be used as a substitute for personal service, it
is obviously . . . different and distinct from the latter. . . . It is within the power of
the legislature to provide for substituted service in cases of necessity or if personal
service is for any reason impracticable.”).
82. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (“Against this interest of the State we must
balance the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
83. See 72 C.J.S. Process § 71 (2009) (illustrating the validity of statutes
authorizing substituted service as well as being liberally construed so long as they
are guided by the principles of due process); see also ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.1 (allowing
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Although courts are justified in expanding upon the alternatives
available for substitute service, the constitutional sufficiency of the
84
method must remain valid.
Yet, while the constitutional standard may limit divergence, it
can also be a catalyst for change when rules become outdated and
85
antiquated. The constitutional standard of due process requires a
plaintiff to use a method reasonably calculated to reach the
defendant, which implies that courts must provide the methods
appropriate for doing so. When the methods available are no
longer reasonably calculated to reach the defendant, the courts
must, in turn, make the changes necessary to comply with the
86
Because of the influence of modern technology on
standard.
communication patterns, electronic service may be a significantly
better means for reaching a defendant, making the exclusion of
87
electronic service suspect. Due process requires that the method
employed reflect an actual desire to inform the defendant, and
when the defendant is best informed through electronic service,
the exclusion of this method is in conflict with this underlying
88
Because the constitutional sufficiency for affording
principle.
notice is factually specific, the plaintiff is required to conform to
89
the actual behavior of the defendant. But when the methods for
providing notice do not conform to actual behavior, due process
becomes a loophole, rather than a safeguard, for defendants to
90
evade service.
Currently, the Minnesota rule for substitute service is limited

alternative service, other than by publication, when the other forms available
prove impracticable and with court allowance); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.021 (allowing for summons to be left at place of business if
personal service is unavailable); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.310 (allowing for alternative or
substitute services as directed by the court when personal service proves
impracticable).
84. See 72 C.J.S. Process § 71 (2009).
85. See supra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text.
86. 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1764 (2009).
87. Because of the increasing prevalence of electronic communication, the
constitutional standard of due process will eventually force courts to expand
substitute methods to include electronic service of process. This is because the
factual basis for what is most “reasonably calculated to reach the defendant” has
changed, and, in turn, the processes used to afford notice must change. See
discussion infra Parts IV.A, B.
88. 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1764 (2009).
89. See id.
90. See Chacker, supra note 2, at 597.
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91

to providing notice through face-to-face interaction.
The rule
states that service of the summons can be conferred upon an
individual by “delivering a copy to the individual personally or by
leaving a copy at the individual’s usual place of abode with some
92
person of suitable age and discretion.” The rule’s construction
and the recent Shamrock decision require the plaintiff to physically
find the defendant or else prove she is intentionally evading service
93
in order to justify the use of service by publication. Other than
notice by physical delivery or service by publication in rare
occasions, the only other option is through constructive notice by
94
certified mail. The rule remains greatly restricted, suggesting a
preference for service through face-to-face interactions and a
95
strong skepticism towards substitute service. This preference is
acceptable as long as physical notice continues to be the most
96
reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. The fundamental
assumption of the rule is that other than personal service, the most
reliable means for affording notice is by leaving a copy of the
summons at the defendant’s home with a person of suitable age
97
Meaning, people are most likely to receive
and discretion.
91. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03; see supra notes 71–74 and infra notes 94–103 and
accompanying text. Although Minnesota does offer the alternative of service by
certified mail, this is considered constructive notice and only available where the
defendant waives her right to service.
Additionally, although service by
publication is also an option, it can only be exercised once all other alternatives
are exhausted as a last resort for achieving finality of the suit. See MINN. R. CIV. P.
4.03; see also Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 384
(Minn. 2008); see also discussion supra notes 41–45 and corresponding text.
92. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a).
93. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383; see also MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05. As
discussed earlier, it has become increasingly apparent that courts do not consider
service by publication a valid means for conveying notice, other than as a last
resort. See discussion supra note 22 and accompanying text; discussion infra Part
IV.A.
94. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04, 4.05. Although the rules allow for service by mail,
in accepting such notice, the defendant is considered to have waived his right to
service of process. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d). The courts strongly encourage service
by mail as it is an efficient and cost effective means for delivering notice. See
Shultz, supra note 4, at 1503. However, at its foundation, notice by mail still
depends on physical interaction, with the postman and roommates as
intermediaries. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05. As discussed earlier, it has become
increasingly apparent that courts do not consider service by publication a valid
means for conveying notice, other than as a last resort. See discussion supra note
22 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
95. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04; see also Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 382.
96. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
97. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05; see also Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 384.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 4
10. Klander.doc

254

12/2/2009 4:40 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

information through face-to-face interactions, such as from a
98
roommate, than by any other means. If, however, notice through
an internet posting, for example, were a significantly more suitable
means for affording notice than through a roommate, its exclusion
could be deemed unconstitutional. In an age where face-to-face
communication is becoming eclipsed by electronic and online
communication, it is logical that electronic service would be a
99
significantly more suitable means for reaching the defendant.
The rigid construction of the current rule seeks to protect the
defendant’s right to due process, but as modern society changes, it
100
does so at the cost of fairness and judicial efficiency.
C. Changing Patterns of Communication: The Facebook Phenomenon
The internet has quickly become a natural background to
everyday life. In 2002, more than 600 million people worldwide
101
had access to the internet and the numbers continue to rise. Yet
with great popularity comes even greater scrutiny and as one
commentator described it:
It has been vilified as a powerful new tool for the devil,
awash in pornography, causing users to be addicted for
hours each day “surfing”—hours during which they are
away from their family and friends, resulting in depression
98. Due to modern technology and the rise of electronic communication, the
assertion that people have more face-to-face interactions than any other kind is
likely a false assertion. If someone were to have dozens more interactions with
Facebook friends, for instance, than their roommate or spouse, would the denial
of affecting notice through Facebook be unconstitutional? See discussion infra Part
IV.C.
99. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
100. The Fourteenth Amendment and the rule for service of process are
meant to protect the defendant’s right to be heard. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1 (due process and defendant’s rights); 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1444 (2009)
(noting that “[p]rocedural due process means that persons whose rights may be
affected are entitled to be heard, and in order that they may enjoy that right, they
must first be notified.”). Yet the plaintiff ought to be protected from the undue
burden of using ineffective methods for conferring notice where the defendant
can be adequately put on notice electronically. Electronic service is both efficient
and inexpensive, and likely constitutionally superior. See Cantor, supra note 2, at
966 (“Internet service is cheaper than either traditional mail or personal service . .
. [and] is nearly costless to the plaintiff . . . . Moreover, because an email user can
reply to an email without costs, replying to the plaintiff’s service is ‘prepaid;’
therefore, a plaintiff can use email to send a waiver request to the defendant.”).
101. John A. Bargh & Katelyn Y. A. McKenna, The Internet and Social Life, 55
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 573, 573–74 (2004) (discussing the profound effects of the
internet on private lives).
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and loneliness for the individual user, and further
102
weakening neighborhood and community ties.
Whether or not the internet causes such extreme isolation is
certainly debatable, but not within the contemplation of this
103
Rather, this note asserts that the effects of the internet
note.
have so distinctly changed the face of modern society that the
customary means for communication has shifted from face-to-face
104
interactions to electronically-mediated interactions.
Earlier technologies have effected change, but none in recent
105
history has been as influential and extensive as the internet. The
effects of the internet on business and the dissemination of
information are significant, but the more interesting and perhaps
more surprising impact is the effect it has had on interpersonal
106
Nowhere has the effect been
communication and relationships.
107
Today,
more profound than on the most recent generation.
teenagers have never known life without computers or cell
108
Virgin Mobile USA reports that more than nine in ten
phones.
teens with cell phones have text messaging capabilities; two-thirds
109
The dependence on electronic
use text messaging daily.
communication, albeit ingrained upon the lives of teenagers, is
widespread and becoming more common among older
110
The pervasive impact of electronic communication
generations.
102. Id. at 574.
103. See id. (suggesting that the traditional perception that the internet causes
depression and loneliness is a largely exaggerated and unfounded fear).
104. See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.C.
105. See Bargh, supra note 101, at 574.
106. Id.
107. Kaveri Subrahmanyam & Patricia Greenfield, Online Communication and
Adolescent Relationships, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD. 119, 125–37 (2008) (discussing
concerns “about the nature and quality of online and offline relationships and
how online communication affects adolescents’ relationships and well-being”).
108. The cell phone was invented by Martin Cooper in 1973. See About.com,
Inventors, Martin Cooper – History of Cell Phone, http://inventors.about.com/
cs/inventorsalphabet/a/martin_cooper.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
109. See Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 107, at 122. The statistics
show that more than half of Virgin’s customers aged fifteen to twenty send or
receive at least eleven text messages a day, while nearly a fifth text twenty—one
times a day or more. Id. From October through December 2006 Verizon Wireless
hosted 17.7 billion text messages, more than double the total from the same
period in 2005. Id. Recently a study found that teens use instant messaging in
particular as a substitute for face-to-face talk with friends from their physical lives.
Bonka S. Boneva, Teenage Communication in the Instant Messaging Era, in
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AT HOME, 612–72 (Robert E. Kraut et al. eds., 2006).
110. See Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 107, at 124 (outlining a
recent study showing that over 73% of American college students now use the
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on modern society has indisputably changed how people
111
With the advent of social
commonly interact and communicate.
networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter, the use
of computer-related mediums for fostering and maintaining
112
To date, over 300
relationships has increased exponentially.
million people are members of the popular networking site
113
The
Facebook, and 120 million of those members log on daily.
popularity of social networking websites has caused researchers to
begin to study the relationship between patterns of communication
114
Unsurprisingly, many studies show that
and online interactions.
Internet more than their university library for researching term papers); see also
Facebook, July 31, 2009, facebook.com/facebook (citing that the fastest growing
demographic on Facebook is 35 and older); Peter Corbett, 2009 Facebook
Demographics and Statistics Report (July 6, 2009), http://www.istrategylabs.com/
2009-facebook-demographics-and-statistics-report-513-growth-in-55-year-old-userscollege-high-school-drop-20/ (“There has been a staggering increase in the
number of 55+ users – with total growth of 513.7% in the last six month [sic]
alone.”).
111. “Cell phone users in the United States have increased from 34 million a
decade ago to more than 203 million, which comes very close to fulfilling the
Supreme Court’s one man–one cell phone mandate.” Peter Leo, Cell Phone
Statistics That May Surprise You, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 16, 2006,
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06075/671034-294.stm. As of June, 2009, there
were over 227,636,000 internet users in the United States alone, up from
120,000,000 in 2000. Internet World Stats North America, http://www
.internetworldstats.com/america.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
112. See e.g., Facebook Visits Increased 194 Percent in Past Year, http://www
.hitwise.com/us/press-center/press-releases/social-networking-sept-09/, Oct. 9,
2009 (ranking the market share of U.S Internet visits to the top five social
networking sites).
113. Facebook, Press Room–Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/
info.php?statistics (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). Facebook users have a myriad of
options for accessing information about their friends and the avid users total more
than 6 billion minutes spent on Facebook each day. Id. Facebook users can
upload photos and videos, update their statuses and browse web pages via mobile
phone, link to journals and other news-related articles and blogs through the
website, and send messages to friends, as well as have instant message
conversations with friends currently online. Facebook users are online constantly,
checking the status updates of their friends, and sending and receiving messages
between fellow Facebookers online, often from the convenience of their mobile
phones. See the Facebook website for more information on using Facebook
features. Facebook, Getting Started Guide, http://www.facebook.com/help/
new_user_guide.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
114. See Richard P. Bagozzi et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Online Social
Interactions, 9 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 77 (2007); Bargh & McKenna, supra note 101;
Gustavo S. Mesch, Social Context and Communication Channels Choice Among
Adolescents, 25 COMP. IN HUMAN BEHAV. 244 (2009); Subrahmanyam & Greenfield,
supra note 107; Elisheva F. Gross, Adolescent Internet Use: What We Expect, What Teens
Report, 25 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 633 (2004).
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greater use of electronic communication and computer-mediated
interactions
correspondingly
decreases
face-to-face
115
In fact, one commentator noted that although
communication.
much is yet to be learned about electronic communication and
social relationships, one thing is certain: “teens now conduct a
higher proportion of their communication through writing in an
116
electronic medium rather than face-to-face or voice-to-voice.”
Another study found that teenagers spend a week or more online
without ever logging off, as one surveyor in the study indicated,
“I’m always signed on, I always have an awake message up and that
way people can let me know if something major is happening in my
life. I even have an awake message on when I’m asleep or when
117
I’m away at school.’”
With the recent studies pointing to an exponential increase in
the use of electronic communication, it could reasonably be argued
that people currently, or soon will, have a more consistent online
118
With this in mind, the
address than they do a physical address.
assumption that an average person is at home or checks their

115. See Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 107, at 135 (An intense fouryear video study of thirty families with children showed the role of technology in
modern family life. When the working spouse came home the other spouse and
the children were often so absorbed in electronic media they only greeted him
about one-third of the time. “Electronic multitasking has become pervasive,
sometimes at the expense of face-to-face family interaction, among siblings as well
as with parents.”); Bagozzi, supra note 114, at 105 (finding that users of “highinteractivity” web communication, such as Facebook or instant messaging, show a
decreased level of face-to-face interactions with family as compared to before
engaging in online social interactions); Gross, supra note 114, at 646 (“Of
particular note is the extent to which boys . . . resembled girls in their heavy use of
the Internet for social communication . . . . Most participants reported using the
Internet for both social and nonsocial purposes—often simultaneously.”).
116. Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 107, at 136.
117. Generation Speed: Today’s Teens, GOOD MORNING AM. (Sept. 30, 2005),
available at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/ AmericanFamily/Story?id=1172574)
(“The survey included 180 Chicago junior and senior high school students and an
online version completed by 641 teens in eleven states. 62% said they could not
live comfortably without their cell phone, IM or e-mail for more than a few days,
and 31% said life is moving too fast.”).
118. This is certainly already the case with many businesses, and the courts
have already begun to deal with its effects. In Rio Properties, Inc., v. Rio International
Interlink, a casino brought a trademark infringement action against a foreign
internet business. Because the defendant had no physical address, the court
allowed service by e-mail stating, “RII listed no easily discoverable street address
. . . . RII had neither an office nor a door; it had only a computer terminal.” 284
F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
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mailbox more than they are online is highly unlikely. Notions of
due process demand that the court provide the means necessary for
the plaintiff to best afford notice reasonably calculated to reach the
defendant; if this is through electronic service, the court ought to
120
Therefore, when it is significantly more likely that a
allow it.
defendant would receive notice through a posting on her Facebook
page, or through a friend on Facebook, than by leaving a copy with
a roommate, it may be unconstitutional to disallow this form of
121
notification.
Electronic service may not only be constitutionally required,
but may also prove to be a more reliable and effective means for
122
A defendant may easily avoid
reaching an evasive defendant.
service at a physical address by moving or claiming ignorance, but
may find it more difficult to elude service where internet sites and
computer hard drives track specific usage and make information
123
The importance of using electronic service
difficult to delete.
would be especially relevant when dealing with companies that
124
Online-only businesses are
conduct business primarily online.
119. See id.
120. In fact, there have been recent cases suggesting a trend towards the use of
electronic service, especially where there is a foreign defendant. See id. at 1017
(holding that the facts of the case find service by email appropriate form of notice
and, “[i]n proper circumstances, this broad constitutional principle [notice
reasonably calculated to provide notice] unshackles the federal courts from
anachronistic methods of service and permits them entry into the technological
renaissance”); New Eng. Merch. v. Iran Power, 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (holding that where notice upon a foreign defendant is made
impracticable, service by telex is acceptable: “Thus, as it stands now,
telecommunication remains a sound method by which to insure that defendants
are notified of the instant actions.”); In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R.
713, 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that service upon a foreign defendant
via email was sufficient to comport with notions of due process: “Moreover,
communication by facsimile transmission and electronic mail have now become
commonplace in our increasingly global society.”); Shultz, supra note 4, at 1497–
98 (citing Nick Abrahams, Australian Court Serves Documents via Facebook, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/
technology/biztech/lawyers-to-serve-notices-on-facebook/2008/12/16/122918957
9001.html).
121. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
122. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 965 (“Internet service has the potential to be
more secure, and thus more reliable, than any form of service employed in the
past. Digital signatures . . . are harder to forge than traditional signatures . . . .
[U]nlike traditional mail, where one mail box or mail room may serve a number
of people, one internet account usually serves one person.”).
123. See Cantor, supra note 2.
124. See Rio Prop., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir.
2002).
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increasingly prevalent, and in Rio Properties Inc. v. Rio International
Interlink, the court acknowledged service by email as the most
appropriate means for notice because such companies have
“neither an office nor a door; [they] only [have] a computer
125
terminal.”
The use of electronic service provides other judicial and public
126
The increased allowance of electronic
policy benefits as well.
document submissions has already helped to alleviate the crippling
127
The use of
effect of filing and paperwork in courthouses.
electronic filing also significantly improves the overall efficiency of
court dockets, and the allowance of electronic service would likely
128
Justice and
continue to foster goals of judicial expediency.
integrity may be fundamental judicial goals, but the cost and time
of litigation, as a practical matter, is a crucial aspect in every step of
129
The Advisory Committee of the Federal
the judicial process.
Rules of Civil Procedure has indicated that one of its primary goals
is decreasing the costs of litigation, and that service of process is an
130
Furthermore,
area in desperate need of such reform.
constitutional due process preserves the plaintiff’s right to provide
notice, free of overly burdensome requirements, and by a means
131
Because of the
that is both feasible and cost efficient.
125. Id.
126. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
127. John M. Murphy III, From Snail Mail to E-Mail: The Steady Evolution of Service
of Process, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 93 (2004) (discussing the increased
trend towards electronic submissions for discovery documents and motions).
128. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 944 (“The internet is not only commonly and
widely used, but also fast and inexpensive as a means of effecting service.”). See
generally Murphy, supra note 127, at 92–96; Shultz, supra note 4, at 1524; Woods,
supra note 9, at 444; Frank Conley, :-) Service with a Smiley: The Effect of E-Mail and
Other Electronic Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 407,
414–15 (1997).
129. See supra note 128 and corresponding text.
130. Cantor, supra note 2, at 966 (noting the Advisory Committee’s desire to
mitigate the cost of litigation through technology.); Conley, supra note 128, at 411
(“Rule 4 places a strong emphasis on the need to save costs. The rule states that
the defendant ‘has a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons.’”).
131. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–18 (1950)
(“We recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on
frequent investigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries . . . and we
have no doubt that such impracticable and extended searches are not required in
the name of due process.”). See also Cantor, supra note 2, at 966 (suggesting service
via the internet may be constitutionally required in some circumstances because
“internet service is cheaper than either traditional mail or personal service; thus
internet service promotes the Advisory Committee’s desire to limit the overall
costs of service.”).
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commonality of electronic communication and the fact that
electronic service is virtually costless, the logical and
constitutionally reasonable progression would be for such an
132
As the amount of mail delivered decreases and the
allowance.
prevalence of email increases, the continued denial of electronic
service indicates a preference for the defendant, and may become
an easy loophole for the evasive defendant to avoid service of
133
process. Electronic communication has caused the foundation of
Minnesota Rule 4.03 to become archaic, and the evidence of the
numerous judicial and public policy benefits indicates the need for
statutory reform. In fact, the lack of electronic alternatives to
service of process may very well be an unconstitutional oversight.
D. The Trend: Case Law and Rule Changes
However unchanged the standard for service by publication, or
slow the progression towards electronic service may be, cases
calling for the increased allowance of electronic service have
134
New England Merchants National Bank v.
inundated the courts.
Iran Power Generation and Transmission became one of the first cases

132. Cantor writes,
The constitutionality of internet service of process will become
increasingly clear as the number of Americans who rely on the internet as
their principal means of communication increases. If it is obvious that
one’s chosen medium for communication is the internet, then it is also
obvious that the form of notice most ‘reasonably calculated’ to reach the
defendant is also the internet.
Cantor, supra note 2, at 966.
133. See id. at 961 (arguing that internet service would be more difficult to
avoid because “the defendant would be unable to make changes to the web site,
he would be unable to ‘lose’ the service.”). See also Chacker, supra note 2, at 597
(“But what systematically exists as a rightful protection for litigants has developed
into a procedural loophole through which wily defendants can avoid litigation.
More specifically, in certain instances, effectuating notice has become a game of
‘hide and seek.’”); Murphy, supra note 127, at 107–08 (“Indeed ‘service of process
is not a game of hide and seek’ but defendants can often be surprisingly evasive
when it comes to avoiding courts . . . . [A]s technology grows, courts should not
be afraid to use this technology where defendants are hiding from service.”).
134. See Rio Prop. Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding service by email appropriate where defendant is evasive); Ryan v.
Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding service by email adequate even where evasiveness is not extreme); New
Eng. Merchs. v. Iran Power, 495 F.Supp. 73, 81 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (allowing
service by telex); In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs. Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 721 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2000) (holding service by email sufficient).
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135

to allow electronic service of process through the use of telex.
The court recognized the lack of case precedent in such a decision,
but justified the validity of incorporating modern technology into
service of process, stating that “[courts] cannot be blind to changes
and advances in technology. No longer do we live in a world where
communications are conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing
136
In In re International Telemedia Associates,
clipper or steam ships.”
Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court further expanded the use
of electronic service by allowing the use of email to serve an evasive
137
Similar to New England Merchants, the Telemedia
defendant.
Associates court defended its decision despite a lack of
corresponding case precedent stating that, “any unspecified form
of alternative service usually has its genesis in untried or formerly
unapproved methodology . . . . It would be akin to hiding one’s
head in the sand to ignore such realties and the positives of such
138
The court, in both Telemedia Associates and New
advancements.”
England Merchants, recognized that it would not only be imprudent
to ignore technological advances where it would increase a
plaintiff’s ability to effect notice, but that it would simply be
139
Although electronic service is still an exception to the
illogical.
rule, courts have become more inclined to allow electronic service
140
where there is an evasive foreign defendant. Courts have justified
this more liberal application of the rule, because where there is a
foreign defendant and service is impracticable, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allow for court directed service under special
141
In order for courts to allow electronic service on
circumstances.
a domestic defendant, however, there would need to be a
142
statutorily defined rule designating its allowance. Although there
are no states that specifically allow for electronic service on a
135. New Eng. Merchs., 495 F.Supp. at 81.
136. Id.
137. Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. at 720–21.
138. Id. at 719.
139. New Eng. Merchs., 495 F.Supp. at 81; Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. at 719.
140. Rio Props. Inc., v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding service by email appropriate where foreign defendant is evasive); Ryan v.
Brunswick Corp., 2002 WL 1628933, No. 02-CV-0133E(F) at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding service by email adequate even where evasiveness is not extreme); Int’l
Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. at 722 (holding service by facsimile or email was
sufficient to provide notice to evasive foreign defendant).
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3) (service allowed “by other means not prohibited by
international agreement, as the court orders.”).
142. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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domestic defendant, some permit alternative service as “directed by
143
the court.”
However, there has yet to be a case in the United
States where this could be construed so as to include an internet
posting via a Facebook page, for instance.
Despite the lack of electronic service in the United States, it
cannot be long before such case law will begin to surface, because
as noted by the court in Rio Properties, “[t]o be sure, the
Constitution does not require any particular means of service of
process, only that the method selected be reasonably calculated to
144
As the internet
provide notice and an opportunity to respond.”
fast becomes a necessity, and not a choice, statutory reform to
include electronic service has become an imminent issue
145
Allowing electronic service has
beckoning immediate attention.
146
For
begun to become more prevalent in other countries.
example, in a groundbreaking service-of-process case, an Australian
defendant suffered a default judgment obtained through the
147
exercise of service by publication via Facebook. However unique,
the Australian case denotes positive signs that the judiciary
worldwide is beginning to recognize and incorporate electronic
148
methods of communication into the processes of civil procedure.
Although the United States has not yet incorporated electronic
service into service of process, there are signs that the trend is
149
moving in that direction. Recent changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure suggest that there is a general trend toward
150
There have been parallel
allowing electronic service.
developments in the service of documents electronically in the
151
In 1996, the Federal Rules of
federal and state judiciary system.
Civil Procedure were amended to make “clear the equality of filing

143. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
144. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017.
145. Conley, supra note 128, at 426 (“According to Bill Gates, Chairman of
Microsoft, the internet is at the center of the action. ‘Microsoft, among others, is
already programming to a future that can’t exist without the Web.’ . . . The move
toward electronic communication is a serious one . . . .”).
146. Shultz, supra note 4, at 1498 (quoting Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve got Mail:
The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337,
381–82 (2003)).
147. Shultz, supra note 4, at 1497 (citing Nick Abrahams, Australian Court Serves
Documents via Facebook, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12, 2008.)
148. Shultz, supra note 4, at 1498.
149. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
150. Murphy, supra note 127, at 94–95.
151. Id. at 92.
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152

by electronic means with written filings.”
Similarly, rules 5(a)
and 5(b)(2)(E) work together to allow the electronic delivery of all
pleadings and papers as long as the parties consent to it in
153
Furthermore, under the rules of discovery, parties are
writing.
required to provide any electronically stored documents unless
154
But perhaps the closest analogous change
unduly burdensome.
is in the use of electronic postings for class action lawsuits. “Even
absent judicial decree, parties to class actions are employing
internet technologies, usually websites, to help meet notice
155
These changes underscore the importance of
requirements.”
electronic communication in modern litigation. Because notice
forms the foundation for litigation, electronic service ought to be
allowed.
E. Shamrock Decision: Call for Statutory Change
The Mullane court articulates the tension between protecting
notions of due process and the allowance of service by publication:
“Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a
156
While this may have been true in the past, the
newspaper . . . .”
potential for service by publication to be a valid form of
notification has increased with the advancement of modern
157
Electronic communication through social
technology.
networking sites and internet postings offer a far more directed
and intentional method for affording notice than an advertisement
158
in a local newspaper.
The constitutional standard articulated in Mullane does not
bar publication as a means for affording notice. It may even
encourage its use when it is the means most reasonably calculated
159
to reach the defendant. The Court struck a balance between the
competing tension of due process and judicial finality by
articulating a variable standard where sufficiency of service is
160
determined by reasonableness rather than a bright-line rule.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e), § 28 (1995), amended by FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3).
Id. 5(a), 5(b)(2)(E).
Id. 26(a)(ii), 26(b)(2)(B).
Cantor, supra note 2, at 958.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
Id. at 315 (“The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually
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Yet, despite the Court’s clear articulation of the standard, the
judicial system has been slow to adopt this formula when it comes
161
Increasingly
to modern technology and service by publication.
complex business models and the transformation of
communication modes have impacted nearly every aspect of civil
procedure and modern litigation, but have yet to influence the
162
Several commentators have
standards for service by publication.
addressed the need for the judicial system to more accurately
reflect the present status of modern-day communication, in terms
163
of best informing notice and the standards for service of process.
Fortunately, as aforementioned, a recent Australian case has
confronted the use of service by publication through electronic
means when it permitted a default judgment via a posting on
164
One commentator optimistically adds, “[n]ecessity,
Facebook.
the mother of invention, has frequently been the catalyst for
adapting the law to implement new technologies, and if a situation
arises in which a message sent via Facebook is the only means to
serve an elusive defendant abroad, the law might, in due time,
165
In a world where business and social
adapt accordingly.”
networking is accomplished via the internet, and where service of
process is the most fundamental aspect of the operation of law, it is
logical to reduce constraints on service and permit a variety of
166
electronic means. The fundamental purpose of due process is to
afford the defendant adequate notice and the opportunity to be
167
Mullane articulated the policy rationale behind due
heard.
process: the right to be heard and the corresponding need for
flexibility. Accordingly, it is only necessary to begin to allow the
incorporation of electronic notification.
Nevertheless, the Shamrock decision, although purporting to
informing the absentee and that one might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those
affected . . . .”).
161. See discussion supra Part II.
162. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
163. See sources cited supra note 75.
164. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
165. Shultz, supra note 4, at 1528.
166. See Id. at 1527.
167. Cantor, supra note 2, at 945 (“The notice function of service protects the
defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights not to be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. A fundamental component of due
process is the opportunity to be heard . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
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maintain the status quo, effectively built an additional barrier to
electronic publication as a permissible means for service of process.
The hierarchical approach approved of in Shamrock requires the
plaintiff to first exhaust all other alternatives before exercising
service by publication. Although the Court’s concerns regarding
adequate due process are certainly justified, given the efficacy of
modern-day technology, due process may be better served through
168
a more liberal application of the rule. Because service of process
is so fundamental to the administration of the law, it ought to be
more amenable to change and adapt according to modern
169
advancements in electronic communication.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Shamrock did not call for a modern adaptation for
service by publication, the court’s hierarchical interpretation of the
170
rule not only reiterated the status quo, but further restricted it.
This court reflects the majority sentiment that service by
publication is an inadequate means for giving notice, but perhaps
this is misguided. As society trends toward public electronic means
of communication, the means for affording adequate notice must
necessarily change as well. With the advent of web communication
such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogging, electronically-mediated
171
Where service by
communication has quickly become the norm.
publication was once an inferior means for providing notice, it may
now be a viable, if not a constitutionally required method of
172
service.

168. In fact, as one commentator suggests, “Electronic publication . . . could
actually offer a greater likelihood of providing notice than the traditional method
of service by publication.” Woods, supra note 9, at 444.
169. Conley, supra note 127, at 417 (“The inevitable result of human progress
is that courts are, and always will be, faced with the question of how to apply
existing laws to new human behaviors to ensure that the judicial process continues
reliably and preserves the parties’ legal rights. . . . [C]ertain processes are so
fundamental to the operation of law that historically they have been more open to
adaptability and change.”).
170. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
171. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
172. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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